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  • Another reason for selecting a

    2018-11-15

    Another reason for selecting a management Pitolisant hydrochloride based on trust is that performance measures may be ambiguous. As Ouchi (1980) comments, in such cases, trust is essential for the alignment of individual and organizational goals. Where traditional bureaucratic mechanisms based on explicit control fail because it is impossible to externally evaluate the value added per individual, the use of trust is more strongly recommended. Some scholars note that the intensive use of explicit control mechanisms, such as formal monitoring, is likely to increase the risk of opportunism (Van de Ven and Walker, 1984; Aulakh et al., 1996). Thus, over-reliance on explicit guarantees can greatly impair the development of trust relationships. Undermining trust relationships can be costly because the use of trust does not require additional expenditures with legal guarantees. Where trust is present, the need for explicit monitoring and control and its associated costs are reduced. In addition, the intensive use of explicit control mechanisms involves not only investments in formal monitoring and control but possibly a considerable loss of motivation of individuals in meeting organizational goals (Ripperger, 1998). Ouchi (1980) and Dasgupta (2000) note that the ability to monitor the actions of individuals is crucial in deciding between explicit control mechanisms and trust. Insofar as tasks become more complex, interdependent or ambiguous, the ability to monitor and evaluate individual performance is reduced. In these cases, contracts become more dependent on informal agreements between agents, and trust is required for expectations to be met. Empirically, we will always find a combination and coexistence of formal and informal mechanisms acting in complementary ways at different levels within business environments (Ouchi, 1980; Bradach and Eccles, 1998; Zanini, 2007). Ouchi (1980) notes that complementary formal and informal control mechanisms can often be found at different levels in any organization. We thus propose the graph in Fig. 3, showing the relationship between the need for trust and the specificity of organizational tasks. Insofar as organizational tasks are more complex, uncertain, ambiguous or interdependent, the need for trust between interacting agents increases. The graph suggests that efficiency in the execution of organizational tasks of this nature will depend largely on existing trust between interacting agents (e.g., in the relationship between managers and subordinates, partners, coworkers or agents in multifunctional teams). Insofar as the good produced demands the involvement and contribution of several experts, it is more difficult to measure the individual contributions of each agent. When individual evaluation is ambiguous, productive activity will depend on the trust that interacting agents have in their own appraisers or in the evaluation system. The same is true of more complex tasks, where the results to be obtained are more unpredictable. Conversely, the less complex, uncertain, ambiguous, and interdependent are the required tasks, i.e., the more predictable are the results, the less is the need for trust, and in such cases, formal contracts could be used relatively more efficiently. However, as noted by Zanini (2007), reliability and control are better understood as complementary management mechanisms, not as substitute ones. There will always be some level of both trust and control in any organizational environment.
    Conclusions
    Introduction The first difficulty in investigating the causes of crime is that reliable information is hard to come by (or virtually non-existent). Existing official data, especially that available in police records, consists only in underestimated figures for actually committed crimes. The number of criminal occurrences is underestimated because many of them are not actually registered in a formal police report. Actually, as suggested by victimization surveys conducted in Brazil and abroad, there is clear evidence that the actual crime rate is significantly higher than that reported based on official data. In other words, the official figures underestimate the scale of crime that has such a negative impact on the lives of citizens. Therefore, albeit useful for guiding public security actions, the data contained in police records is not sufficient for one to know the actual crime rate to which society is exposed to. As an attempt to correct this situation, victimization surveys began to be carried out in the United States in the 1960s. These surveys are based on a random sample of a given population, which is asked about instances of certain types of crimes in a given period of time. Besides allowing for better measurement of the actual crime rate, among other advantages, these surveys make it possible for one to know the characteristics of the victims and provide important inputs for empirical studies on the causes of criminal victimization.